Anticipating, Analyzing, and Addressing Systemic Risks
Biosecurity
Former Anthrax Weapons Production Facility, Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan. This facility, now destroyed, had the capability to produce an estimated 300 metric tons of weaponized anthrax in eight months. Courtesy of Andy Weber.
Making
Bioweapons Obsolete
From their increasing use and testing of
chemical weapons and nuclear weapon capabilities, countries such as North
Korea, Syria, and Russia are weakening norms against weapons of mass
destruction (WMD). Based on current and emerging technical and political
solutions, the strongest American response to this trend would be to set a
national, moonshot-level vision for eliminating an entire class of WMD.
Biological weapons are a ripe target for such an approach.
In 2019, CSR launched a program on making bioweapons
obsolete as a mass-destruction threat. In the years ahead we will flesh out
this concept as a policy shift for the United States, and advance practical
ideas for meeting this ambitious goal.
While it is not possible to fully end all
biological threats, it is increasingly feasible to create a state in which
national preparedness, response, and deterrence capabilities are sufficiently
advanced that intentional biological attacks would become ineffective in
causing catastrophic devastation. Indeed, the U.S. government is already
working in this direction in many ways that can be expanded and leveraged
toward a bold national vision.
There are several reasons that CSR is taking
this focus in our work. First, a moonshot-level national mission is needed to
inspire experts within and outside of government and unite them in a common
direction. A concerted national vision can also help galvanize the resources
that are necessary to more aggressively counter biological threats that are
today rising and growing more complex.
Additionally, as we’ve explored this concept
with experts across the nation over the past year, it is becoming increasingly
clear that it is feasible to end the threat of biological weapons as we know it
today due to multiple trends combining. These include advances in synthetic
biology and gene editing, significantly reduced costs in synthesis and
sequencing, the continuing spread of widely accessible materials and
techniques, robotics enabling more rapid and cheaper bioproduction, the
explosion in data these advances are driving, and more. Making bioweapons
obsolete will require policy makers to embrace the new normal of rapid
technological change and the ubiquity of biotechnology.
The severity of biothreats also warrants the
approach that CSR is advocating: combining a highly ambitious long-term vision
with practical steps forward. Traditional bioweapons threats remain concerning,
including for their potential catastrophic use by nation-states. Current and
emerging technologies are opening new avenues for traditional and novel
bioweapons attacks, and making the necessary materials and tools more
accessible.
As the CSR team continues this exciting work on
making bioweapons obsolete, continue following via our website and on Twitter @CSRisks.
By William Beaver, Dr. Yong-Bee Lim, Lillian Parr, Christine Parthemore, and Andrew Weber Contributing authors Dr. Natasha Bajema, Dr. Rohit Chitale, Jackson duPont Edited by Francesco Femia and Christine Parthemore December 2021.